Normal professionalism and the early project process: problems and solutions by Chambers, Robert
I N S T I T U T E O F D E V E L O P H E N T S T U D I E S 
AGRICULTURE AND RURAL PROBLEMS 
NORMAL PROFESSIONALISM AND THE EARLY PROJECT PROCESS: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
by 
R o b e r t Chambers 
DP 247 
July 1988 
The early project process is dominated by engineers and 
economists, and preoccupations with infrastructure, budgets, 
schedules, and quantification. The way professionals and 
organisations think and operate biases the process against 
poor people. A new professionalism and a new paradigm start 
with people rather than things, and adaptive processes 
rather than blueprints. Practical implications for thls 
approach include the need for calibre, commitment and 
continuity in field staff, restraint in funding, use of 
methods of rapid rural appraisal, and support for 'learning 
projects' without deadlines or targets. 
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NORMAL PROFESSIONALISM AND THE EARLY PROJECT PROCESS: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
'The disturbing feature of most of these design and 
appraisal faults is that they are well-known, yet 
the evaluation literature is replete with 
complaints that they keep being repeated' . 
Cassen and Associates 1986 :174 
Definitions and Scope 
In this paper 'the early project process' refers in the 
sense of World Bank terminology to identification, 
preparation, analysis, and appraisal (Gittinger 1982:21-4), 
and the equivalents to these activities as conducted by 
other governmental, ald and NGO agencies. This early 
project process presents many well known and well documented 
weaknesses. Those listed by Cassen and Associates in the 
quotation at the head of this paper refer to aid, and 
include: 
- overestimating the recipient's capacity for adminis-
tration and implementation; 
- imprecise forecasting of the effects on intended 
beneficiarles; 
- neglect of maintenance and recurrent cost requirements 
for operation; 
- lack of understanding of the human, social, and physical 
environment; 
- lack of attention to relationships with other projects 
and programmes. 
These are all important, and recent writing would add 
others, especially inadequate participation in all stages of 
the process by those intended to benefit (see eg Rondinelli 
1983; Korten and Klauss 1984; Cernea 1985; Uphoff 1985). 
The thesis of this paper is that these are not all; that to 
correct them , however necessary, is not sufficient and that 
in addition there are other factors and defects,which also 
partly explain why mistakes go on being repeated. These are 
assoclated with normal professionalism and with political 
and bureaucratic pressures. 'Normal professionalism' here 
means the thinking, valúes, methods and behaviour dominant 
in professions, disciplines and departments. In this paper, 
it refers especially to engineering and economics as the 
professions and disciplines most influential in defining and 
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executing the early project process. The argument is that 
measures can be taken to mitigate or avoid these factors and 
defects once they have been recognised. 
Normal Professionalism 
Normal professionalism has ingrained biases. These reflect 
'core' or 'first' characteristics which contrast with others 
which are 'peripheral' or 'last' (Chambers 1983:171-9 and 
1986). These show up, to take one illustration, in 
preferences for technology, as in Table 1. 
Table 1 Preferences for Technology 
Core or First 
large-scale 
capital-intensive 
inorganic 
market-linked 
mechanical 
developed in core 
'high' technology 
Peripheral or Last 
small-scale 
labour-intensive 
organic 
subsistence-linked 
human or animal-powered 
developed in periphery 
'low' technology 
The 'first' list is preferred by most normal professionals, 
while the 'last' list is usually closer to the resources and 
needs of poorer rural people. 
There are many influences which reproduce and reinforce 
normal professionalism's bias against the poor. Some of 
these are evident in the relative status between and within 
professions and disciplines. High status, and the rewards 
of power and money that go with it, are associated with 
things more than people (or with people treated as things), 
with men more than women, with quantification more than 
qualitative assessment, and with specialisation more than 
general competence. Precisión with things and numbers is 
valued more than participation with people. Much normal 
professionalism valúes hard data, measurement, calculations, 
the correct execution of established rules of analysis, and 
planned blueprints which promise control and certainty. 
Urban concerns are also preferred to rural, and industrial 
to agricultural. Interlocking, these tendencies mean that 
engineering has higher status and carries more weight than 
agronomy, and economics than sociology or social 
anthropoíogy. 
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Professions and the Early Project Process 
High normal professional status coincides with the 
professions and disciplines - engineering and economics -
which are dominant in the early phases of the evolution of 
both institutions and projects. 
With institutions, the outstanding example is the World 
Bank. Its original title - the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development - reflects the primacy of the 
physical in the word 'Reconstruction1, which moreover 
precedes 'Development'. The early concentration of the Bank 
on infrastructure and industry is strikingly illustrated by 
John King's (1967) book Economic Development Projects and 
Their Appraisal which presented 30 cases, of which 17 were 
in electric power, 9 in transport, and 4 in industry. None 
was classified as agricultural, or concerned with human 
resources. Given this emphasis, it was natural that the 
World Bank should be dominated by engineers and economists, 
as were aid agencies generally. 
With projects, too, a similar 'natural' dominance is normal. 
Most projects of any size, even when they are agricultural, 
start with hardware and construction - roads, houses, 
stores, dams and so on - requiring surveys, planning, 
blueprints, procurement, purchasing, scheduling, and 
construction of roads, houses, stores, dams and so on - all 
within the domain of engineers. These are preceded by 
financial estimates, economic assessments, and statistical 
justifications - the domain of economists. People, and the 
professions concerned with people, tend to come later. 
Although there have been changes since the days when Hamnett 
(1970) was recruited as a sociologist to solve the problems 
with people after the engineers had made the decisions about 
things, it is still true that in larger projects the 
"harder" professions set the style and the main agenda. 
Sociologists and social anthropologists start as poor 
relations. They are rather a nuisance. Their contributions 
often appear negative. They often explain why things should 
not be done, or should be done more slowly. They raise 
objections and slow down disbursements and implementation. 
The view of the higher status and more powerful 
professionals can be that those concerned with people should 
keep quiet until their time comes - later. 
The law of prior bias then operates. This is that what 
comes first in a process sets patterns and takes most. The 
modes of operation of the blueprinting phase of engineering 
design and economic assessment, dealing with physical 
things, planning and estimates, carry over into 
implementation and operation. The style has been set, and 
remains, top-down, time-bound, and mechanistic. Thinking, 
valúes, methods and behaviour which fit and work with things 
are then applied later to people, with whom they fit and 
work less well. 
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Bureaucratic and Political Pressures 
Bureaucratic and political dynamics also reinforce 'firs--
and prior biases. Aid officials and host country officlals 
are subject to pressures which are so prevalent and weil-
known as to be commonplace. These are 
- to produce a portfolio of projects quickly; 
- to spend budgets, especially aid budgets, by deadlines; 
- to include capital goods from donor countries as part of 
projects; 
- to reduce staff numbers (as retrenching donor governments 
slim their aid agencies and host country bureaucracies are 
cut back in structural readjustment) 
In aid agencies, these pressures favour fewer, larger 
projects with more 'first' characteristics, since these 
enable fewer aid staff to spend more, to spend it fáster, 
and to spend more of it in the donor countries. Normal 
professionalism is then reinforced and normal professionais 
rewarded. Engineers and economists are seen to have most to 
contribute to the expeditious implementation of such 
projects, while soft social scientists asking awkward 
questions complicate things and slow projects down. 
Engineers and economists remain on top. Those primarily 
concerned with people, especially the poorer people, remain 
marginal. 
In many agencies, things have changed and continué to 
change. I do not undervalue the enormous professional 
contributions of engineers or economists, ñor suggest that 
they always neglect people. The point I am making, though, 
is that there are systemic forces - in normal 
professionalism, in the sequence of activlties in the 
project process, and in the dynamics of aid bureaucracy -
which favour the 'first' and neglect the 'last'. 
Project Process Pathology 
The theory of project identification and of other early 
project activities is that they are subject to systematic 
and rigorous procedures. Enormous efforts have been made to 
develop and improve these, especially their mathematical 
components. In the real world, however, major defects 
remain, and separately or combined, reduce benefits to the 
poorer. Four are easily overlooked: irreversibility of 
commitment; anti-poor bias in methodology; the 'cooking' of 
cost-benefit analysis; and additive procedures. 
i. irreversibility of commitment 
With médium and large donor-supported projects, commitment 
to go ahead is often irreversible at an early stage. 
Whatever the theory in the textbooks, in reality the 
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decisión is 'pre-empted' rather than 'taken' because of a 
slide of political commitment making it embarrassing for a 
donor to withdraw. This can occur long before the later 
stages of preparation, analysis and appraisal. It would be 
worth investigating whether it is true that the larger the 
project, the earlier the commitment becomes irreversible. 
'Commitment' here refers not to any formal agreement or 
signing of documents, but to the point at which withdrawal 
becomes politically difficult to contémplate. There are 
cases, like the development of the New Lands in Egypt, or 
the railway to the North in Burkina Faso, where Governments 
have pressed ahead with little or no donor support; but more 
common are situations in which donors are hooked early on 
and then cannot escape even if they want to. Two examples 
from British aid are the announcement by the then Prime 
Minister, James Callaghan, on a visit to India, of a £30 
million fertiliser aid project for which there had been no 
serious appraisal, and the Victoria dam in Sri Lanka, the 
largest British foreign aid project ever, where donors were 
in competition and so in a hurry to become committed. 
Whether these have proved good projects is not the point 
here. The point is that for political reasons, including in 
those days the need to spend the aid budget, commitment to 
go ahead was deep at an early stage, and largely Independent 
of the formal project process which then followed. 
The irreversibility of such commitments, whether by donors 
or by host governments, can even resist adverse technical 
reports. Commitment in Kenya to irrigation on the lower 
Tana was probably politically irreversible for the Kenya 
Government as early as the mid-1960s, despite negative 
appraisals by a succession of technical missions. It gave 
birth to the Bura Irrigation Project which must be a leading 
contender for the strongly contested prize for the least 
economic irrigation scheme in sub-Saharan Africa; and not 
only is the project grossly uneconomic, but those who were 
meant to benefit have, despite huge costs, done badly (Moris 
1987: 103-6). Bad projects rarely benefit the poor in the 
long term; and preventing them requires early action to slow 
or stop the slide into commitment. 
ii. the anti-poor bias in methodology 
Among the many biases in normal professionalism, those which 
are methodological are among the least recognised. In 
project identification, the most important events usually 
occur in the early stages, but methodologically these are 
the least determínate, the least observed, and the least 
written about. For these reasons, identification in the 
narrow sense of having and lodging the idea of a project is 
often, ex post, a black box. And ex ante it is easily 
influenced by those with special interests or local power. 
The neglect of the identification phase is illustrated in J. 
Price Gittinger's classic and magisterial Economic Analysis 
of Agricultural Projects (1982), which devotes only one page 
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out of 443 (not including the bibliography and glossary-
index) to 'Identification'. To be fair, one page of 
Gittinger contains more words than most books. It is, 
though, the content as well as the length of the treatment 
that matters. The page starts: 
The first stage in the (project) cycle is to find 
potential projects. There are many, many sources 
from which suggestions may come. The most common 
will be well-informed technical specialists and 
local leaders. While performing their professional 
duties, technical specialists will have identified 
many areas where they feel new investment might be 
profitable. Local leaders will generally have a 
number of suggestions about where investment might 
be carried out ... 
(ibid.21) 
Other sources of suggestions include proposals to extend 
existing programmes, and needs for certain agricultural 
products. For all these, though, Gittinger says little 
about the process and procedures. These are, it seems, most 
commonly left open to the normal biases of professionals and 
to the suggestions of the members of local elites. Such an 
approach appears unlikely to generate many projects which 
give priority to the expressed needs and priorities of the 
poorer rural people. 
iii. the 'home economics' of cost-benefit analysis 
Such biases in identification are liable to be confirmed by 
early irreversible commitment. But in theory they should be 
mitigated by cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 
Certainly, in choosing between alternatives for components 
of a project, CBA is useful. Sensitivity analysis is a 
useful aid to decision-making. Economic analysis can be 
used effectively for damage limitation (Harvey 1986: 448-
50). It can also be used to prevent bad projects if they 
can be caught early enough. 
But the defects of CBA are several. Partly it is the 
seductive attraction of the single number - a benefit-cost 
ratio, or an internal rate of return - which is easily given 
more weight than it deserves; Gittinger himself warns that 
economic and financial measures are only tools of decision-
making and not substitutes for judgement. Partly it is that 
discounting the future supports decisions which are unsound 
for the environment and for future generations. Especially 
where future livelihoods are likely to be more vulnerable, 
and people likely to be poorer, there is a case for 
discounting in reverse, valuing the future more, not less, 
than the present. Partly, too, CBA has difficulty 
accounting for losers from development projects, and often 
they are the poorer, and unseen and unheard. 
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Finally, CBA appears to be what it is rarely, if at all: an 
objective scientific procedure impartially carried out. For 
in its practice it is more art than science, and grey art at 
that. Irreversibility of commitment, political pressures, 
and personal judgements of the worth of a project, combine 
to encourage and legitimate a practice unlikely to feature 
in textbooks, manuals, or courses such as those of the 
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank. This is 
working cost-benefit analysis backwards, a skill 
transmitted, one may surmise through craft apprenticeship in 
economists' offices, or reinvented under stress. In this 
reversed process, a judgement is first made about what 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is appropriate, and then 
assumptions - about future prices, rates of implementation, 
rates of adoption of practices by farmers and so on - are 
derlved so as to generate the IRR required. The judgement 
on which the IRR was first assessed may have been sound. It 
may also have been politically determined. When political 
commitment is already irreversible, and a certain IRR is 
needed for a project to be accepted bureaucratically, then 
not to follow such a practice of 'cooking' may combine 
political embarrassment and conflict with dismal prospects 
for the analyst's career. It may even be that the larger 
and more expensive the project, the more the IRR is likely 
to be an artefact of political realities, the hypothesis 
being that the bigger the cake, the more thorough the 
cooking. 
iv. additive procedures 
One response to defects and criticisms such as these has 
been to reorganise and add to the procedures of the early 
project process. In this USAID has been in the lead. New 
appraisal criteria have been agreed and incorporated in 
required procedures. At first sight these look good. 
USAID's social soundness analysis, for example, raises 
questions about people which could otherwise be overlooked. 
But the succession of additional considerations - who gains 
and who loses, women, and now the environment - contrasts 
and conflicts with cutbacks in aid agency staff. When fewer 
people have to do more they either work harder, put the work 
out, change their methods, take longer, or do less and do it 
worse. The last is the greatest danger. Just as adding 
another member to a multidisciplinary team can reduce 
communication in the team, so adding another criterion or 
procedure in the early project stages can lead to 
superficiality and tokenism on the part of those who are 
overworked. It can then appear more important to be able to 
show that, women's interests say, have been investigated and 
reported on, than that the report on women's interests is 
correct and has actually been acted upon. Unless aid 
agencies have staff with time, capacity and authority to act 
on adverse reports, they are liable to culminate as entries 
in files which show that the required study was completed 
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and the report duly received. Consummation is then confined 
to a tick in a box. With procedures, it is but a short step 
from the complex to the cosmetic. 
Large Projects: Prevention Often Better than Cure 
These four defects - irreversibility of commitment, the 
anti-poor bias in methodology, the cooking of cost-benefit 
analysis, and additive procedures - bear on the strategic 
question of choice of size of project. 
The current fashion of condemning large projects can go too 
far. It is true that large projects are sought after by 
host governments and donors alike for well-known less than 
altruistic reasons such as prestige, patronage, personal 
ambition, commercial interests, corruption and the need to 
expend budgets. But such motives should be separated from 
the question whether a project is or was worth doing. 
Critics of existing large projects in the rural sector, such 
as big dams, hydroelectric schemes, major road construction, 
and processing factories, should reflect, case by case, on 
whether they are saying that a given project could and 
should have been implemented better, or that it should not 
have been done at all. Faced with the latter question, 
negative social scientists will sometimes crumble. Who, for 
example, and despite its adverse effects, would suggest that 
it would have been better for the poor of Egypt if the Aswan 
dam had not been built? Each case, ex ante as well as ex 
post, deserves to be examined on its merits. A final 
argument in favour of large projects could be that with 
understaffed aid agencies, the lower administrative demands 
made in total by fewer larger projects would improve the 
chances that the additive procedures designed to protect and 
favour the poor, women, and the environment would be well 
implemented and would bite. 
That said, much evidence and argument makes large projects 
look less attractive than in the past. They have always 
been vulnerable to major and expensive problems. When 
Albert Hirschman in the 1960s studied 11 large World Bank 
projects, he feared a biased sample because of the high 
standards insisted on by the Bank, but reported 
"Fortunately, (at least for my research) I found, upon 
looking more closely, that not one of the projects I had 
selected had been free from serious problems" (1967:1). Ñor 
was the "creativity" he found being mustered to overcome 
problems costless. Two decades later, many of the better 
big projects have already been identified and implemented. 
Those that remain are less attractive, riskier, and on worse 
sites, and often involve more losers in populations that 
would be harmed or displaced. Adverse environmental effects 
are also better understood and more predictable. To these 
points can now be added the first three defects discussed 
above - irreversibility of commitment, the anti-poor bias in 
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methodology, and the misuse of cost-benefit analysis. Big 
is not always or necessarily bad. But it is now more often 
bad than it used to be. 
In consequence, we are moving into a phase in which self-
restraint and new skills are increasingly needed to question 
large projects and seek alternatives to them. How to do 
this is a subject for research, public information, and 
lobbying. One of the healthiest developments of recent 
years has been the emergence of international networks of 
activist NGOs committed to the rights of peripheral people 
who stand to lose from projects. Another has been the tough 
line taken within and by the World Bank over the rights and 
welfare of poor people displaced by dams, to the extent that 
this has been effective. But there still remain questions 
of how host and donor agencies, staff and politicians can 
learn to prevent and abstain from bad large projects. This 
subject deserves study in its own right. For the present, 
four suggestions are: 
i. to identify and count the losers from a project and give 
their welfare a high weighting; 
ii. to seek ways to break large projects into smaller 
units. This is more often possible than realised. For 
example, several small dams along a river, with lift 
irrigation from their reservoirs, can quite often substitute 
for one large dam with gravity irrigation; 
iii. to avoid premature political commitment by keeping a 
low profile, emphasising political risks and costs, and 
avoiding early high-level meetings of donor and host 
political leaders; 
iv. to prefer consultants who are willing and able to give 
a proposal the thumbs down, and reward major negative 
decisions with public recognition (a place in the honours 
list for recommending against the big dam and so losing the 
lucrative contract for supervising implementation). 
The New Paradigm and the New Professionalism 
The prevention of bad big projects can be compensated by the 
promotion of good small ones. Despite the power and inertia 
of normal professionalism, the past two decades have 
witnessed shifts in the valúes, procedures and even balance 
of power within and between professions and organisations 
engaged with development. Donor organisations now seek to 
support more small projects identified and implemented by 
NGOs. More attention is given to people, especially women 
and others who are disadvantaged. It is not so much that 
the numbers of sociologists and social anthropologists in 
host governments and aid agencies has increased: they are 
still very few indeed (astonishingly, ODA still has only two 
Social Development Advisers). It is rather that new ways of 
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thinking and new valúes have diffused and been adopted and 
internalised by many others in other disciplines and 
professions. 
These changes embody parts of the new paradigm and the new 
professionalism of development which have been emerging 
(Jamieson 1987; Chambers 1986). Rey elements in these are 
reversáis of the normal - to put people before things, to 
decentralise, to enable and empower the poorer and weaker, 
to valué and work on what matters to them, and to learn from 
clients rather than always to teach them. 
The very nature of the new paradigm makes its examples 
inconspicuous and easy to overlook or undervalue. 
Decentralised small-scale activities are less visible than 
centralised infrastructure. Social development is harder to 
see or photograph than physical development. Evolutionary 
change is less noticed than revolutionary. The enhanced 
capability of a resource-poor farmer to experiment and adapt 
is not as evident as a new pump or tractor. Perhaps because 
of its poor visibility, the paradigm is already more 
prevalent than some observers realise. 
With projects and other development initiatives, one of the 
clearest expressions of the new paradigm and professionalism 
is the learning process approach (Korten 1980, 1984). Of 
this, many recent examples could be given. One is the 
OXFAM-supported Yatenga Project in Burkina Faso which 
followed two failures - a multi-million dollar soil 
conservation fiasco, and a small-scale attempt to introduce 
agroforestry methods from Israel. In contrast with these, a 
highly successful water harvesting approach was finally 
evolved mainly from indigenous technology in a way which met 
the priorities of the people (Reij et al 1987; Harrison 
1987). Another is the Karnataka Social Forestry Project, 
supported by ODA and the World Bank. This has evolved 
continuously, learning from mistakes and criticism, and 
moving towards bureaucratic reorientation and decentralised 
micro-level planning. Yet another is the ODA-supported 
Integrated Rural Development Programme in Zambia (Mellors 
1987) which began in a technical blueprint mode and evolved 
into decentralised institution building, with an approach 
and procedures designed to encourage and empower local 
authorities. These examples show that the learning process 
approach is not limited, as some suppose, to NGOs. To the 
contrary, some donor agencies have moved towards it, as has 
ODA with its procedure of Planning by Successive 
Approximation (PBSA), used in the Karnataka and Zambia 
projects. 
The blueprint and learning process modes have different 
implications for the early project process. This can be 
seen by examining their contrasts as in Table 2. 
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Table 2: The Blueprint and Learning Process Approaches in 
Rural Development Contrasted 
idea 
originates in 
first steps 
design 
supporting 
organisation 
main resources 
staff 
development 
implementation 
management 
focus 
content of 
action 
communication 
leadership 
evaluation 
error 
effects 
associated 
with 
Blueprint 
capital city 
data collection 
and plan 
static, by experts 
existing, or built 
top down 
central funds and 
technicians 
classroom, didactic 
rapid, widespread 
spending budgets, 
completing projects 
on time 
standardised 
vertical: orders 
down, reports up 
positional, changing 
external, 
intermittent 
buried 
dependency-creating 
normal 
professionalism 
Learning Process 
village 
awareness and action 
evolving, people 
involved 
built bottom-up, with 
lateral spread 
local people and 
their assets 
field-based action 
learning 
gradual, local, at 
people's pace 
sustained improvement 
and performance 
varied 
lateral: mutual 
learning and sharing 
experience 
personal, sustained 
internal, continuous 
embraced 
empowering 
new professionalism 
Source: Chambers 1986:23, adapted from David Korten personal 
communications. 
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The learning process approach changes the early stages of a 
project. Project identification is no longer a discrete 
activity; it is continuous. In the blueprint mode, 
identification is a black, or at best grey, box, preceding 
| the main procedures where the searchlights shine. In the 
learning process mode, identification is not a one-shot 
event, but an adaptive sequence of finding out what best to 
do. 
Although they are presented here as dichotomies, the 
blueprint and learning process approaches can be and have 
been combined in many ways (see e.g. Rondinelli 1983) with 
titles such as planning by successive approximation, or the 
structured flexibility approach. Quite often such 
combinations will be appropriate. But the pulí of normal 
professionalism towards blueprinting is so strong that 
without sustained reversáis, the learning process pole has 
too little weight. No apology is needed for stressing it 
here. For better development actions, it should usually be 
much more to the fore. 
Practical Implications 
To implement the learning process approach on any scale has 
many requirements and implications. Three stand out: 
i. calibre, commitment and continuity of field staff 
The top priority is to enhance the calibre, commitment and 
continuity of field staff, and increase their numbers. They 
may be nationals or foreigners, and in Government or in 
NGOs, but unless they are of high calibre, committed, and 
able to stay for a matter of years in the same place, they 
are unlikely to nurture effective learning processes, 
involving as these do enabling, empowering, and 
institutional development. To guote a recent study: 
Two things are quite clear: there can be no 
successful development scheme without an efficient 
institution to push it through, and behind every 
efficient institution we will almost invariably 
find - at least in its early stages - an individual 
who is both an entrepreneur and an innovator. 
(Lecomte 1986: 116) 
The learning process is staff-intensive, and requires good 
staff. 
ii. restraint in funding 
Two much money, or money too soon, or budgets which have to 
be spent by given dates, drive field staff into 
blueprinting. The budget which has to be spent in two weeks 
before the end of the financial year has to be converted 
P* 
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into things, for example cement, which points to physical 
construction not human process. Large budgets mean 
buildings and machinery rather than self-help and self-
reliance. Large sums thrust on NGOs tempt them to induce 
participation and to achieve early results through 
subsidies. These then prevent learning from participants, 
because poor people will undertake work in which they are 
not interested if they are paid or fed for it. Big budgets 
hinder learning. 
iii. rapid appraisal 
Continuous monitoring, learning, adapting, and appraising 
require their own timely and cost-effective methods. Rapid 
rural appraisal (RRA) now has a repertoire of techniques 
which makes it versatile, both for individuáis and for 
teams. The International Conference on Rapid Rural 
Appraisal held at Khon Kaen University in September 1985 
(Khon Kaen University 1987) concluded, moreover, that RRA 
was not a second best, but to the contrary was often, when 
well conducted, superior to other known approaches. Its 
further development and widespread adoption are impeded by 
conservative normal professionalism, but it has shown its 
effectiveness in project identification (see e.g. Harvey and 
Potten 1987). Its application for enabling rural people to 
analyse their condition and identify their own projects and 
priorities deserves further development. 
RRA has a crucial part to play in the early project process. 
Given the early political irreversibility of commitment to 
many médium and large projects, rapid assessments in the 
very early stages can matter more than later longer studies 
and surveys. Such RRAs can steer projects before they are 
set in direction and form. They can also provide early 
warnings and help prevent bad projects. It reflects on the 
normal professionalism of aid agencies that they have not 
applied RRA methods more systematically in the early project 
process, and have left their development more to 
universities and NGOs. 
Learning Projects' 
Dissatisfaction with the dominance of the project approach 
to development has provoked a search for complements or 
alternatives. A working group at Cornell University has 
christened a disparate family of these as "paraprojects" 
(Uphoff 1988). The family consists of: 
- local capacity-building mini-projects 
- removing deterrents or lack of incentive 
- appropriate technology-cum-organisation 
- planning and management improvement 
- savings-and-credit systems 
- horizontal diffusion 
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- campaigns 
- bureaucratic reorientation 
- research and action programmes 
Uphoff identifies three general features of these: although 
funds are in most cases an important outside contribution, 
they are generally more labour-intensive than capital-
intensive; they mobilise local resources including ideas and 
management skills; and their goals are qualitative change 
with quantum shif ts in activity and outcome. The list 
serves to underline the range of alternatives to normal 
projects. Not all paraprojects, as listed here by type, are 
necessarily incompatible with a normal project approach; but 
they do show the importance of ideas, institutions, and the 
learning process: for initially at least, most of them would 
be difficult to blueprint. 
Crosscutting some of these types of paraproject is an 
approach which follows from the key factors of calibre, 
commitment and continuity of field staff, restraint in 
funding, and adaptive rapid appraisal. This can be 
described as the learning project. In an ideal type of 
learning project, funds are available but no fixed capital 
budget has to be spent, and there is no pressure on staff to 
spend or to spend more; there are no targets for physical 
achievements; there is no preference for visible as against 
invisible change. These reversáis of the normal led me in 
an earlier versión of this paper to use the term 'anti-
project', but 'learning project' better captures the 
positive thrust of the approach. 
The essence of the learning project is good staff put in the 
field and sustained for periods of months or, more likely, 
years, exploring and learning from and with local people and 
trying to see how better they can gain what they want and 
need. With a learning project, it can take many months, 
even years, before substantial money should be spent, if it 
should be spent at all. Michael Shulz of Euro Action Accord 
spent 20 months in Port Sudan before making the first loan 
of a credit programme, a delay which caused consternation in 
headquarters: yet the programme was later hailed as an 
outstanding success. But the word 'yet' still reflects the 
oíd mindset. The success was not in spite of, but because 
of, the long gestation, the long identif ication, during 
which understanding and mutual confidence built up. Without 
the long, slow, exploratory start, it is unlikely that the 
second 20 months would have seen, as they did, no less than 
1,500 small loan projects designed. Perhaps one of the 
great lessons in rural development is that 'identification', 
in its hurried and obscure normal professional form, is much 
of the problem, and patient and continuous learning and 
evaluation in the field are much of the solution. In this 
perspective, the learning project is not so much an 
alternative to the normal project as a different way of 
starting and continuing. 
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For the future, three needs stand out. The first is to see 
where a learning project approach has the highest pay-offs. 
It may be with the diverse and complex farming systems of 
the resource-poor farming areas of the worid, which are now 
such a priority for agricultural research. In these, new 
farming systems can require múltiple Innovation both 
si.-nultaneously and over time, as was the case at Yatenga. 
Examples of such innovations are water harvesting and 
agroforestry. The second need is to develop institutions 
which can support learning projects with the necessary 
patience and flexibility. This entails changing rules and 
expectations. While NGOs have some advantage here, there is 
no reason why Governments and aid agencies should not do 
likewise. They will need, however, to protect learning 
project staff from pressures to spend funds. One device to 
this end is to draw off the pressure to spend by supporting 
parallel normal projects to absorb the funds. The third 
need is to train, inspire, encourage and reward the new 
professionals who make good learning project staff. That is 
difficult, but not Impossible. Identlfying a learning 
project means finding staff who are new professionals, and 
then supporting them in their extended local-level work, 
accepting that this may or may not later lead to the 
identification of normal projects. A start can be made by 
finding those who are already on the ground. For new 
professionals do not have to be invented. They are already 
working in many places, and increasingly support each other. 
Concludinq 
There are further implications for Governments, aid 
agencies, and NGOs. To reduce the pressure to disburse 
funds, other uses for aid budgets must be found: debt 
relief and foreign exchange support are obvious candidates. 
Some necessary big projects can also help. At the same 
time, more staff are demanded by the new approach. Too many 
politicians and managers hold the peculiar view, perhaps 
traceable to adolescent readings of Parkinson's Law, that it 
is always cost-effective to reduce staff, described 
pejoratively as 'administrative overheads1. But reducing 
staff usually makes those who remain spend more time in 
offices and with paper, keeping them further from their 
poorer clients, and preventing learning. Many NGOs now know 
better. Much good rural development from which the poorer 
gain is staff-intensive, and the intensity has to feed right 
back into the donor agency. SIDA is being forced to cut its 
staff while its budget is raised. This perversity will 
probably reduce aid effectiveness. One defensive, if 
schizoid, device, might be to divide donor agencies into two 
- a big spending división with normal projects, and a high 
budget to staff ratio, and a learning project división with 
a low budget to staff ratio. In any case, more, not fewer, 
donor agency staff are needed by the new approach both in 
their headquarters and in host countries where they can 
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increasingly be host country nationals. And Southern 
Governments and Southern NGOs also themselves need more 
continuity in their field staff. 
Finally, a step for all concerned, of whatever profession, 
discipline or nationality, is to recognise and offset the 
imprint in their minds of normal professionalism and normal 
project identification. When people are put first, and the 
poorer rural people first of all, it is more they who do the 
identifying and who set the priorities. At this frontier of 
the early project process, the question is not just 
identification for whom, but identification bx whom. Some 
big projects will always be worthwhile, but one lesson of 
experience in rural development is that many successes start 
small and slowly and evolve through participatlon and mutual 
learning, with and by committed new professionals. 
Structures, policies and procedures can and should be 
modified to release them from pressures to spend and to give 
them freedom to explore and learn. The challenge is also to 
find, train and support many more of them. For the key to 
improving the early project process is not just changes in 
management, needed though they are, but more pointedly, 
better people in the field. 
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